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The Task Force Report 
J. T. Montague 
The author gives a philosophical analysis of the gênerai 
ténor of the Woods' Report, and provides a brief appraisal 
of its observations, particularly in regard to collective 
bargaining. 
The time seems to hâve arrived to wax philosophical and appraise 
the broad strokes of the report. Something can be said about the gênerai 
ténor of the Woods' Report and, indeed, of the rôle it has visualized for 
collective bargaining. 
One observation is in order at the outset about the environment in 
which the Task Force Report exists and competes for attention and 
support. This is not the only such report to be issued in Canada during 
récent years. There hâve been reports on bargaining in the civil service, 
on bargaining within certain provincial jurisdictions, and on how bargain-
ing has measured up to économie objectives in Canada. In total, there 
must be at least six or seven reports. Bargaining seems to hâve become 
the darling of the report-writing set, and of the report-demanding man-
darins of governmcnts. 
One would hope that the report writing of récent years fortells im-
portant changes in practices and laws — for ail the reports arose out of 
dissatisfactions. Improvements hâve already taken place in civil service 
bargaining and in certain provincial practices. But the results so far appear 
to hâve been of mixed value in the eyes of most observers. Now we seem 
to be entering a new phase in the use of the insights that hâve been 
brought together. This may well be an unproductive stage that will dis-
courage us ail, if only because of the change of pace involved. The origins 
of this next phase in the saga of col-
lective bargaining in Canada are in-
digenous to the reports. The reports 
hâve much in common. But more 
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often they offer strikingly différent approaches to the issues that hâve been 
raised about bargaining. It almost seems one can take stock of his pré-
férences and then find a report to match. Each observer or parti-
cipant in the bargaining process can choose his own poison and champion 
his favourite report. The danger is a polarization of opinion on how to 
handle the institution of bargaining — a war of reports fully equipped 
with crusades, héros and villains. Such events, and we hâve already seen 
some in British Columbia and in Ontario, could minimize the importance 
of the whole exercise. 
The Task Force Report has, however, distinguishing features in its 
field. The writers of this report hâve set themselves a wide area of interest. 
Perhaps only the Rand Report in Ontario has anything approaching the 
same sweep to its work. But the Task Force Report is certainly alone in 
the degree to which it struggles with perspectives on the purposes of 
bargaining and its meaning for the economy. Other reports hâve been 
less informative in this respect. The flourish with which some of the 
reports approach their subject seems to fortell a philosophy and approach 
to bargaining as complète as the formai attire of a burlesque queen at a 
charity bail. But as the same reports carry on with an obvious lack of 
consistent approach to the meaning of bargaining, it would appear the 
more appropriate simile would be to the queen's attire late in her régulai* 
theatrical endeavour. At least the Task Force catches the young lady about 
half way through her act. Nevertheless inadequacies in the basic philosophy 
will be seen below as a major problem of the report. 
The underpinnings of a report on bargaining are crucial. Why do we 
hâve the animal around (i.e. bargaining), and what is it we want to ac-
complish by having it around ? The Rand Report, for example, avoids the 
issue and merely takes collective bargaining as given. Then it grafts on 
prohibitions of practices that offend the public. Ail this takes place with-
out any assessment of the raison d'être which one would hâve thought 
should influence the logic of any suggestions. The same can be said of 
the Nemetz Report in British Columbia. 
The Task Force does go so far as to offer a clear statement of its base 
for assessing the mechanics of bargaining. It is made very clear that in 
the opinion of the members of the Task Force there should be no reshaping 
of the process of bargaining that deprives the economy of answers jointly 
shaped by labour and management. They hold to this view even if the cost 
is inconvenience to society in the form of strikes. Thus the report turns 
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away from many forms of compulsion urged in other reports and searches 
dilligently for half-way houses when some form of compulsion appears un-
avoidable. Areas such as emergency disputes and mass picketting are 
treated in ways that suggest the minimum of compulsion while retaining 
bargaining characterization. 
The pure bargaining approach carries its own difficulties even though 
most of us will agrée with it as far as it goes. It lacks, however, any con-
ceptual framework other than expediency. You pay your money and take 
your choice as to just what you think will impede or assist collective bar-
gaining. And the issue becomes one of how to make bargaining work for 
its own sake. The technique of analysis is comparing, and subjectively 
evaluating, potential nuts and bolts of the opération. The only wider ana-
lysis of any revelance is the codifying examinations of power relationships 
and its product, the mish-mash of seemingly endless variety of ways of 
doing business. 
Moreover, the lack of a thorough-going conceptual framework invites 
conflict. Analysts set individually satisfactory frameworks for the effective-
ness of bargaining and a « Tower of Babel » effect émerges. One of the 
unsatisfying parts of industrial relations work is the failure to communi-
cate in meaningful ways. While it is undoubtedly true that théories of the 
market and bargaining theory are not now in the best of shape, they do 
give more to work with, the above form of analysis implies. Even the 
most rigid of theoretical économie analysis has long since ceased to look 
on unions and bargaining as merely the purveyors of unpredictable reform 
in the labour market. J. R. Hicks nailed this one thirty-seven years ago. 
The Task Force does less well in explaining the usefulness of bar-
gaining. It is really not good enough to tell us that collective bargaining 
is substantiated because it is keeping with liberal-democratic traditions in 
this country. Surely this is a support for the nuts and bolts of the opération 
and not the rationale for having it around. Without some more enlightening 
understanding of the goals sought by the Task Force through the instrument 
of bargaining it is difficult to evaluate the work of the report. The exercise 
seems to be reduced to fiddling with the « hang-ups » of bargaining. 
The Task Force asks Canadians to put their money on collective 
bargaining. Although Canadians hâve never legislatively done so in a posi-
tive way, we hâve more or less aligned ourselves among the converted. 
The Task Force appears to want more active support of bargaining, and, 
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indeed, an expansion in the areas of the labour force eligible. But it would 
seem the more urgent query in the minds of Canadians is « having given 
support to collective bargaining what has been done to our range of alter-
natives in such areas as monetary policy, industrial development and labour 
standards ? » 
Industrial relations people hâve the nasty habit of departing the pre-
mises when such questions are asked. But the Task Force did not avoid 
the issue as blatantly as some of its predecessors. In effect, the Report 
steers a careful course among the range of possible alternatives in the 
relationship of bargaining and the economy, apparently not wanting to 
claim either positive interrelationship or complète absence of interplay. 
The suggestion is that économie studies are by no means certain of whe-
ther or not bargaining has an independent effect over and above market 
effects on wages and, in turn, on the economy. It is noted, however, that 
the studies appear to hâve found that unions and bargaining do play a rôle 
in wage setting, but the time and conditions must be described. The Task 
Force might hâve strengthened its case if it had set forth the pretty gene-
rally held opinion of economists that market forces hâve played a much 
more dominant rôle in the labour market than once was thought to be the 
case, or, in other words, if the Task Force had stated more positively 
what has been found. This might hâve made the Report less défensive in 
some of its recommendations and the reasoning behind them. 
There might hâve been less tendency to protect the « rare gem » of 
collective bargaining and more inclination to send bargaining out to do its 
job in the economy, if its rôle had been appraised. The Task Force is 
left with an argument that bargaining is « alive, well and living in Paris » 
and that something ought to be done to bring it home. Surely the more 
positive point would hâve been that bargaining is « alive, well and giving 
Canadians fits. » The former reasoning leads to playing with the instru-
ment of bargaining, the later reasoning leads, in addition, to économie and 
social effects. 
Task Force reasoning about the importance of bargaining has inde-
pendent important académie support more or less by default. J. R. Hicks 
talked about the importance of labour standards on priées once the gold 
standard went by the boards. Keynes avoided important difficulties by 
freezing most labour market conditions before he began his analysis. 
Strangely enough the Task Force chooses to confine its analysis to bar-
gaining. In effect, it reversed the earlier thinking based, in the first in-
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stance, on an impressive chart of how an industrial relation system opérâtes. 
It was swayed by current pressure to evolve industrial relations Systems 
or, in other words, to develop a means of analysis in areas others hâve 
taken as frozen. Instead of treating the conditions of labour input as given, 
the Task Force treats everything else as given, and proceeds to fiddle with 
the can of worms marked industrial relations. 
Such is the only explanation consistent with the readiness of the 
Report to make positive assertions about characteristics of the Canadian 
economy where controversy exists, or even rages. Assertions about the 
Canadian economy and its opérations are made with much more certainty, 
and with much less room for variation, than are the recommendations on 
bargaining. In the latter area, variation and alternative approaches are set 
forth, but not so on économie conditions. For example, the combined word 
on Canadian-American relations, business cycles and their effect on bar-
gaining power are somehow combined into a seven-line paragraph. 
Now where does this leave us ? Frankly, I thing it makes it possible 
to agrée with many of the recommendations, but also to disagree with the 
report. The question is one of scope or the sweep of the issues that are 
used in explaining the difficulties of bargaining over the years. 
The Task Force undoubtedly put its finger on the major overt causes 
of difficulty. Five areas appear to hâve caught the interest of the group : 
( 1 ) Public aversion to strikes. 
(2) Inept government intervention. 
(3) Loading the bargaining process with tasks inappropriate to its 
work. 
(4) Technical problems with the law. 
(5) Failure of those involved in bargaining to abide by the law. 
The question becomes whether or not the Task Force attacked prob-
lems with sufficient scope of inquiry behind their analysis. Or put more 
positively, would there seem to be a différent set of recommendations in-
volved in a wider look at what industrial relations mean to the economy. 
We can try the exercise in a few gênerai areas. The answers we will corne 
up with would seem to be not so much in conflict with what the Task 
Force said, as they will indicate that wider support for the suggestions 
exists, and perhaps in some cases a little différent emphasis would hâve 
been in order. 
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We start out by appraising the view taken of the union and bar-
gaining. In Task Force terms the usefulness of unions and bargaining is 
limited to a kind of « mod » version of the thinking of the Webbs at the 
turn of the century. Bargaining is the démocratie way of gaining the views 
of the worker and creating a better chance of making theory stick. But 
surely it is this one-sided reasoning that leads to treatment of the union 
as nothing more than a power structure with which to badger manage-
ment. This may be the worker's reason for joining, but scarcely the shape 
of overall participation in the economy such as the analyst requires. Little 
note is taken in the Report of the outeome of the state of comparative lite-
rature on industrial relations Systems of the world which appeared in the 
fifties. 
The link between industrialization, unions and industrializing élites 
established in comparative studies has been interpreted in the North Ame-
rican context to give rise to assuming a problem solving flavour for bar-
gaining as opposed to the rigidity of any imposed evangelic objectives. 
Problems to be undertaken in this context are not simply those of the 
employée, but also those of the employer, the union and, at times, society 
at large. 
Some understanding of the broader view of bargaining would hâve 
made the treatment of the strike much easier to corne by. The strike is 
looked on in Task Force terms merely as a catalyst injected into decision-
making about labour. It is not pointed out why this particular catalyst 
should be supportable over others that might be used except by implication 
in the gênerai opposition to arbitration. Standard answers to questions 
about strikes are trotted forth. They are few and far between. Society can 
stand a few strikes just like we can withstand an intake of arsenic if the 
dose is small enough. But nowhere does it say that the strike is an inté-
gral part of the bargaining process. 
The point is that the strike, or the ability to hold up a labour deal in 
a problem-solving exercise, is little différent than the right to call off hag-
gling over the deal for any other factor or product. The only real différence 
is that the employment effects of a break in negotiations are more imme-
diately obvious and, since nobody is working during the strike there is time 
to thrash the whole thing out in public. The strike adds a new perspective 
to the haggling of labour and management through adding a cost dimension 
to the process. Without the strike or lockout the bargaining process has 
much in common with a close horse race in which you hâve no bet. There is 
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really no need for the Report to hâve been défensive about strikes. More, 
in fact, could be said about their use along with the effectives of the var-
ious parts of the bargaining process. It might asked whether the strike or 
lockout is as forcefull a weapon as it once was. Has the ingenuity of the 
modem business man and of to-day's trade unionist combined to move 
the strike on its way to the muséum as far as a pressure for seulement is 
concerned ? Many feel there is something of this change in current trends. 
If this is so, and we still feel the need of a pressure for seulement, the 
question is not should we hâve strikes, but what would we do without 
them? 
A broader approach might hâve altered the judgement of the Task 
Force about the part government might play in industrial relations. There 
is no doubt left in the Report that the hope is that the government wilï 
play a lesser rôle as time goes by. The analysis is heavily influenced by 
government aversion to strikes and the resulting policies which clash with 
the prédisposition of the Task Force. In a way, it is a curious unanimity 
that émerges. Government policy in the past has presupposed settlements 
without strikes and this aim has dominated policy. The Task Force says 
concentrate on settlements, but take the strikes if necessary. Both put 
their emphasis on settling disputes, and the thrust of their efforts is in this 
direction to the exclusion of any concern for the process of bargaining. The 
Task Force, however, appears to believe the flexible policies it advocates 
could ne ver be achieved by the civil servant. Thus they advocate non-
government ad vice on policy matters at times of crises. But non-crises 
times barely catch attention in the Report. 
For example, the tone of the suggestions for the Industrial Disputes 
Commission, the Labour Relations Board and even the dreary prognosti-
gation for the Labour Department is one of advancing the cause of the 
non-government advisor in time of crises. One would hâve thought that 
this flies in the face of the issue. Surely, the standing criticisms of the in-
dustrial relations expert has been his lack of opportunity to sift through 
the output of government policy, the observations of the Economie Council 
and many other sources for their relevance to bargaining. Such things are 
relevant — in fact that is the whole point of the exercise as originally con-
ceived. The seeming insulation of bargaining from the world around it is 
just what is worrying people. The Task Force says we should hâve more 
of the same agony in order to get the most out of bargaining. 
This is not to say that I leap to the other extrême and support a plan 
to hâve Mr. Mackasey thread the eye of the needle as a part of his daily 
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setting-up exercises. On another occasion I said with apologies to a poet 
whose name I cannot pronounce : « One swallow does not a summer 
make » and eight gulps do not a labour policy make. 
Mr. Mackasey has had remarkable success this year and nothing can 
detract from his accomplishment. But I cannot help observing his depart-
ment because it helps develop my point. After his first success the Minister 
was pictured in the newspapers in bed, in the altogether. His later successes 
were marked by photographs as he was combing his hair, shaving — 
until eventually in the darkest moments of the Air Canada dispute he 
emerged in full attire. 
But has he clothed fédéral labour policy in full attire ? I gather the 
Task Force would say not. And Mr. Mackasey says his department is 
working over the Report very carefully in making up its mind about the 
future. So presumably most people see the présent as a time of planning. 
The Task Force analysis makes a good case for redirecting govern-
ment activity, but I doubt that it makes a case for the implied minimizing 
of the government's continuing rôle. It would hâve been more to the point 
to hâve suggested that governments should make more effort to be better 
informed, first in what is going on in the world of industrial relations, 
and second what thèse events mean to the Canadian economy. If this were 
done, matters of intervention, support for the bargaining process, and even 
such things as certification, surely fail in line. It is simply not good enough 
for governments to limit their view of collective bargaining to disputes. It is 
less rewarding to see the Task Force fall into the trap of thinking past 
performances of Canadian governments were exemplary of what might 
be done. 
The key to the argument about the Department of Labour is the need 
to look beyond dispute seulement and to insist on this wider view for the 
crux of policy décisions. This is not an advocacy of so-called co-operation 
or other well-intentioned shoring up of bargaining. But my point is that 
the administration of labour policy through a crises orientation falls short 
of needs and plunges the discussion of industrial relations into a pretty nar-
row area of concern. Labour policy in Canada has not been found wanting 
in good intentions, but in the breadth of its base of reasoning. A good 
example would be the récent advocacy of the simple bargaining unit of civil 
servants in Ontario on the grounds of past over ail efficiencies. But nothing 
is said about whether it has, or has not, permitted zeroing in on the pro-
blems the employée and employer share. 
It may be that I still cannot break loose from my fourteen years in 
the government service, but I think the Department of Labour needs the 
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chance to raise its sights not to limit its vision to a department of industrial 
relations. Full time labour relations boards with their narrow ternis of 
responsibility offer no help in overcoming my worries and neither do in-
dependent commissions. The need is for a continuing body to be a watch-
dog on industrial relations, to make us ail aware of its strengths and weak-
nesses, and to relate it to the economy as a whole. Its action side should be 
strong, but the second level of importance in the department. 
This is really not much to ask. The time is long past when collective 
bargaining was regarded as something that could twist, reshape or even 
smother the labour market into a troublesome and completely independent 
market. Neither the institutionalists nor the theoretician hold sway in 
thinking about the labour market today. Both sides, as Ulman has said, 
hâve retreated. But in économie studies the models used, now with some 
measure of confidence, are closer to the usual allocation models than they 
once were. Thus there is a beginning on the job of reaching into the area 
of collective bargaining for insights into the economy, and for the basis of 
wise industrial relations policy. But it is a never-ending job, and I do not 
know who does it if the government does not. 
LE RAPPORT DE L'ÉQUIPE SPÉCIALISÉE 
EN RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL 
Le Rapport Woods est un de plusieurs de son genre à être publié depuis ces 
dernières années : d'autres couvrent la négociation dans les services publiques, la 
négociation soumise à certaines juridictions provinciales, et la position qu'elle oc-
cupe par rapport aux objectifs économiques du Canada. Ces rapports discutent 
beaucoup de points semblables, mais utilisent des approches fort différentes aux 
points de litige soulevés par la négociation. 
Le Rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail occupe une position 
unique parmi ces rapports, en ce sens qu'il tente d'éclaircir les intentions dans une 
négociation et sa signification pour l'économie, l e Rapport offre même un énoncé 
clair du fondement utilisé pour évaluer les techniques de négociation. Il exprime 
clairement qu'on ne doit pas procéder à une restructuration des procédures de né-
gociations qui puisse priver l'économie de solutions partagées par le travailleur et 
l'employeur. Le Rapport rejette des formes de contrainte même là où la contraite 
semblait inévitable. 
Un cadre conceptuel autre que la convenance manque à la forme pure d'analyse 
du phénomène de la négociation, et cette forme n'est pas sans inviter des conflits. 
À notre avis l'Équipe spécialisée ne réussissait pas à expliquer l'utilité de la 
négociation et ne l'évalue pas d'une façon analytique, malgré qu'elle demande aux 
Canadiens d'appuyer la forme de négociation collective. 
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Cinq secteurs majeurs créent une difficulté dans la négociation : 
1 ) l'antipathie publique face à la grève ; 
2) une intervention gouvernementale inepte ; 
3) l'attribution au mécanisme de négociation de rôles qui ne lui sont pas 
appropriés ; 
4) les problèmes techniques face à la loi ; 
5) la faillite des personnes impliquées dans la négociation à respecter la loi. 
L'Équipe spécialisée considère la grève comme un catalyseur injecté dans la 
prise de décision concernant le travail, et ne l'intègre pas comme partie réelle du 
mécanisme de négociation. À notre avis, elle devrait le faire. 
Nous croyons qu'une approche plus large à la question aurait pu modifier le 
jugement de l'Équipe spécialisée sur le rôle que le gouvernement doit jouer en re-
lations industrielles. Nous aimons croire que le gouvernement jouera un rôle plus 
important dans le champ des relations industrielles, quoique cet espoir semble con-
traire à l'idée avancée par l'Équipe spécialisée. 
L'analyse de l'Équipe spécialisée prouve bien la nécessité de réorienter l'acti-
vité gouvernementale. C'est douteux par contre qu'elle ait réussi à prouver la mini-
misation impliquée dans sa preuve, du rôle prochain du gouvernement. Ce n'est pas 
suffisant que le gouvernement se limite à la considération des disputes relevant de 
la négociation collective. Le Ministère du Travail doit pouvoir non seulement régler 
les disputes mais aussi coordonner les relations industrielles et ses politiques géné-
rales touchant l'économie. La seule administration des décisions politiques touchant 
les champs de crise ne répond pas aux besoins et restreint la discussion des relations 
industrielles à un champ d'analyse beaucoup trop étroit. 
LE SYNDICALISME CANADIEN (1968) 
une réévaluation 
Les objectifs syndicaux traditionnels et la société nouvelle (Jean-Réal Cardin 
— Gérard Picard — Louis Laberge — Jean Brunelle). Les structures syndi-
cales et objectifs syndicaux (Stuart Jamieson — Philippe Vaillancourt — 
Roland Martel). La démocratie syndicale (Gérard Dion — Adrien Plourde). 
Les rivalités syndicales : force ou faiblesse (Evelyne Dumas — Gérard 
Rancourt — Raymond Parent). Le syndicalisme et les travailleurs non-
syndiqués (Léo Roback — Jean-Gérin-Lajoie — F.-X. Légaré). L'extension 
de la formule syndicale à des secteurs non-traditionnels (Shirley B. 
Goldenberg — André Thibaudeau — Raymond-G. Laliberté — Jean-Paul 
Brassard). Le syndicalisme et la participation aux décisions économiques 
(Bernard Solasse — Jacques Archambault — Fernand Daoust — Charles 
Perreault). Les syndicats et l'action politique (Vincent Lemieux — Marcel 
Pépin — Laurent Châteauneuf et William Dodge). Le syndicalisme, la société 
nouvelle et la pauvreté (Hon. Maurice Lamontagne). Bilan et horizons. 
Annexes : Le syndicalisme au Canada ; la Concurrence syndicale dans le 
Québec. 
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